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Quantum key distribution protocols typically make use of a one-way quantum channel to distribute
a shared secret string to two distant users. However, protocols exploiting a two-way quantum
channel have been proposed as an alternative route to the same goal, with the potential advantage of
outperforming one-way protocols. Here we provide a strategy to prove security for two-way quantum
key distribution protocols against the most general quantum attack possible by an eavesdropper.
We utilize an entropic uncertainty relation, and only a few assumptions need to be made about the
devices used in the protocol. We also show that a two-way protocol can outperform comparable
one-way protocols.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 89.70.cf, 03.67.Ac
INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) research has been
primarily focused on one-way protocols: one party, Alice,
prepares states, sends them through an insecure quantum
channel, and then another party, Bob, does a measure-
ment [1, 2]. However, in the last decade, two-way proto-
cols have been proposed where Bob prepares states, sends
them to Alice through an insecure quantum channel, Al-
ice does an encoding on the states, sends them back-
wards through the same quantum channel, and then Bob
performs a measurement [3–7]. Paradigmatic examples
of these kind of protocols are the so-called “Ping-Pong”
protocol [6] and the LM05 protocol [7]. The former uses
entangled states, while the latter uses non-orthogonal
states. They have also been experimentally realized [8–
11].
It is not yet clear what the full potential of two-way
protocols is, but there are at least several reasons why
they are interesting. One motivation is that some two-
way protocols are deterministic, that is, they do not re-
quire any sifting of the raw keys generated due to a mis-
match of basis choices. For example, the LM05 protocol
[7] has this advantage. The Ping-Pong protocol, which
is based on super dense coding (SDC) [12], has no ba-
sis choices and therefore is also deterministic. Moreover,
this protocol is conceptually interesting, as SDC can be
turned into a QKD protocol.
One implementation of two-way protocols is to use po-
larization encoding of photons in fiber optics. The polar-
ization drift caused by the fiber then needs to be actively
corrected [13–15]. However, if signals are sent backwards
through the same channel, then the polarization drift is
passively corrected by the use of a Faraday mirror at Al-
ice’s side. This means that there may be experimental
situations in which one-way QKD does not succeed be-
cause the error rate is too high but two-way QKD may
still be possible. One QKD protocol that exploits this
fact is the “Plug & Play” BB84 protocol [16, 17]. This
implementation ideally yields one raw key bit for each
qubit signal sent from Bob to Alice and then from Al-
ice to Bob. From SDC we know that two bits can be
communicated by only sending one qubit in this manner.
Therefore, another motivation is that the key rate can
be increased by using the SDC protocol instead of Plug
& Play BB84 by using the same channel resources and
without the need of higher dimensional states or more
complicated measurements.
A major difficulty when studying the security of two-
way protocols is that the eavesdropper, Eve, can attack
each signal twice: once on the way from Bob to Alice,
and later on its way back from Alice to Bob. This gives
her more strategies than in a one-way QKD protocol.
In fact, the Ping-Pong protocol has been shown to be
insecure [18, 19], while recently the LM05 protocol was
proven secure, but by assuming the use of qubits and the
full characterization of all of the devices [20, 21]. Also,
the Plug & Play protocol was proven secure [22, 23] but
by using strong assumptions (e.g. an intensity monitor,
phase randomizer, and attenuator are required, and all
devices, except the source, are fully characterized).
Unlike these previous approaches, we propose a gen-
eral security proof strategy through which devices used
in the protocol only need to be characterized by a few
assumptions. Our assumptions are on the same level as
one-way QKD security proofs that use uncertainty and
complimentarity, such as the proofs by Mayers [24] and
Koashi [25]. This is in contrast to device-independent
security proofs where no assumptions are made about
devices used in the protocol. However, they require loop-
hole free Bell tests, which are not possible with current
technology [26–28]. Our assumptions lie between the
device-dependent scenario, where devices are completely
characterized, and the device-independent scenario. For
example, a device may be characterised by a single con-
stant that can be experimentally bounded.
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2Our proof strategy consists of two main steps. First
we show how to “purify” prepare and measure protocols
into entanglement based protocols. Second, we apply the
entropic uncertainty relation proposed as a tool for secu-
rity proofs of one-way protocols to the purified protocols
[29]. An entanglement-based or purified protocol is one
where Eve prepares a state, sends a part of the state to
Alice and another part to Bob, and then Alice and Bob
perform measurements. The uncertainty relation we use
states [29]: given a tri-partite quantum state ρABE and
two measurements on system A, FX and FZ , described by
elements of a positive-operator valued measure (POVM)
{F iX}i and {F iZ}i with classical outcomes X and Z re-
spectively, then
H(Z|B) +H(X|E) ≥ log2 1/γ, (1)
where H(A|B) is the conditional von Neumann entropy,
and γ := maxi,j ‖
√
F iX
√
F jZ‖2∞ (which we call the over-
lap between the measurements FX and FZ). Given an
operator F acting on a Hilbert space H such that F ≥ 0,
then ‖F‖∞ := max{〈φ|F |φ〉 : φ ∈ H, 〈φ|φ〉 = 1} is the
operator norm on positive operators. Using this uncer-
tainty relation and the Devetak-Winter security bound
[30], we demonstrate how to prove security against the
most general type of attacks for two-way protocols.
Actually we use this method to prove security for two
example protocols: a super dense coding (SDC) protocol
similar to the Ping-Pong protocol [6] and a protocol sim-
ilar to LM05 (which we will also refer to as LM05) [7].
For the LM05 protocol we show an improvement of the
key rate of [20]. Furthermore, we provide a comparison
among relevant two-way and one-way protocols showing
that the former can outperform the latter.
Our proof clarifies the analysis of two-way QKD pro-
tocols and provides an important step towards device-
independent security of quantum cryptography in this
framework. In addition, our results illustrate that the
uncertainty relation Eq. 1 can be useful to prove security
of QKD protocols other than BB84.
We proceed by first defining the SDC and LM05 pro-
tocols in the scenario where only qubits are used. Sec-
ond, we describe purified versions of these protocols in
order apply the uncertainty relation Eq. 1. Third, we list
the assumptions that are needed for the application of
this security proof to implementations of these protocols.
Fourth, we prove the security of the protocols. Lastly, we
compare the key rates to different implementations of the
BB84 protocol.
PROTOCOL DEFINITIONS
In the descriptions of the SDC and LM05 protocols be-
low we assume that the states are deterministically pre-
pared and all devices are completely characterised. This
is for the ease of describing the protocols and this as-
sumption is not be necessary for the security proofs.
There are some similarities between both protocols:
they have two quantum channels between Alice and Bob,
Q1 and Q2, which can be attacked by the eavesdropper,
Eve, using any strategy allowed by quantum mechanics.
Also, Alice and Bob will be performing some X- and Z-
basis measurements. These refer to the projections onto
the eigenvectors of the Pauli operators σX and σZ re-
spectively. In addition, Alice and Bob will do parameter
estimation, error correction, and privacy amplification on
their raw data after the steps outlined below. They abort
their protocol if during parameter estimation they find
that one of their relevant error rates is beyond a certain
threshold.
Qubit SDC Protocol
Bob’s preparation: Bob prepares a maximally en-
tangled state |ψ+〉 = 1/√2(|00〉 + |11〉) and keeps one
half of it in a quantum memory. He sends the other half
to Alice through channel Q1 (see Fig. 1).
Alice: With probability c ≈ 1 Alice applies one of
the four Pauli operators 1, σX , σY , σZ (choosing each
with probability 1/4) to the state from the channel
Q1. She records her choice by storing two classical bits:
00, 10, 11, 01, respectivly. Alice then sends this state into
channel Q2 back to Bob. With probability 1 − c Alice
measures the state from channel Q1 in the Z-basis. She
then prepares |+〉 with probability 1/2 or |−〉 with prob-
ability 1/2, where |±〉 := 1/√2(|0〉 ± |1〉), and sends it
into channel Q2 to Bob.
Bob’s measurement: With probability c Bob per-
forms a Bell measurement jointly on his stored qubit and
his received qubit from the channel Q2. He gets possible
outcomes |ψ+〉, |ψ−〉, |φ+〉, |φ−〉, and then will store the
bits 00, 01, 10, 11 respectively. With probability 1− c he
measures his stored qubit in the Z-basis and his received
qubit in the X-basis.
Post-processing: Alice and Bob repeat the above
procedure N times. Their raw key is the concatenation
of all of their two-bit strings together respectively. Alice
publicly announces which signals she encoded and which
signals she measured.
Qubit LM05 Protocol
In the LM05 protocol [7] Alice and Bob will have the
choice to perform either an X- or Z-basis measurement.
We use a parameter p to denote the probability that Al-
ice and Bob choose the Z-basis, so 1− p is the probabil-
ity that they choose the X-basis. We will consider two
possible versions of the protocol for the simplicity of pre-
sentation. Version 1 is when p ≈ 1, and Alice and Bob
3FIG. 1: Depiction of the ideal qubit SDC protocol. Bob pre-
pares the Bell state |ψ+〉, and keeps half of it in a quantum
memory. He sends the other half to Alice who either does
an encoding (with probability c, solid line) or does a Z-basis
measurement which indicates whether she prepares |+〉 or |−〉
(with probability 1− c, dashed line). Alice sends this state to
Bob who does a Bell measurement with his stored qubit and
the qubit from Alice (with probability c, solid line) or does
a Z ⊗ X-basis measurement (with probability 1 − c, dashed
line).
will only use their X-basis measurement for parameter
estimation (see Fig. 2). Version 2 is when p = 1/2 and
then they will use both X- and Z-basis measurements for
parameter estimation and key generation. Note that the
choice of p will not affect the key rate.
Bob’s preparation: Bob prepares one of the four
states |0〉, |1〉, |+〉, |−〉. He chooses |0〉 or |1〉 each with
probability p/2, and |+〉 or |−〉 each with probability
(1− p)/2. When he picks either |0〉 or |+〉 he classically
stores a 0, when he picks either |1〉 or |−〉, he stores a
1 (we refer to this bit as the preparation bit). Bob also
stores the basis the state is in. He sends the state to
Alice through channel Q1 (see Fig. 2).
Alice: With probability c ≈ 1 Alice applies one of
1, σX , σY , σZ (choosing each with probability 1/4) to the
state from the channel Q1. She records her choice of
encoding. With probability 1 − c she applies a X-basis
measurement (Version 1), or randomly chooses either an
X- or Z-basis measurement (Version 2). Alice then takes
the post-measurement state (when a measurement was
performed) or the encoded state (where a Pauli-operator
was applied) and sends it to Bob through channel Q2.
Bob’s measurement: Bob does a measurement in
the same basis he prepared his state in: if he prepared
|0〉 or |1〉 then he measures in the Z-basis, if he prepared
|+〉 or |−〉 then he measures in the X-basis.
Post-processing: Alice and Bob repeat this proce-
dure N times. If they perform reverse reconciliation then
Bob publicly reveals which basis he used for each signal,
and Alice reveals which signals she measured and which
she encoded. In Version 2 Alice also reveals which basis
she measured in for each signal and then Alice and Bob
discard their measurement results wherever they mea-
sure in different bases. Bob’s raw key is the result of
the XOR of his measurement outcomes with his prepa-
ration bits. Alice’s raw key is made up of one of the two
classical bits 00, 10, 11, 01 corresponding to the encodings
1, σX , σY , σZ , respectively. Whenever Bob measured in
the Z-basis Alice keeps her first bit, and when Bob mea-
sured in the X-basis Alice keeps the second bit.
In direct reconciliation, Bob does not reveal his ba-
sis choice and instead Alice reveals whether she applied
one of the encodings from the set S0 := {1, σY } or the
set S1 := {σX , σZ}. Alice corresponds the encodings
1, σX , σY , σZ with the bits 0, 1, 1, 0 respectively. Bob
then needs to flip his raw bit for each signal that he used
the X-basis and Alice announces she applied an encoding
from S1.
FIG. 2: Version 1 of the ideal qubit LM05 protocol. Bob
prepares one of the four BB84 states and sends it Alice. Alice
performs an encoding (with probability c, solid line), or a
measurement in the X-basis followed by the sending of the
post-measurement state (with probability 1− c, dashed line).
Bob performs a measurement in the Z- or X-basis whenever
he prepared states in the Z- or X-basis respectively. Bob
then does an XOR of his measured bit and his preparation
bit corresponding to his prepared state.
We now purify these two prepare and measure QKD
protocols by showing that they are equivalent to proto-
cols that start with entangled states distributed by Eve
followed by measurements by Alice and Bob.
PURIFIED PROTOCOLS
We introduce two purified protocols that are struc-
tured such that a pure state is shared between Alice, Bob,
and Eve; and then Alice and Bob perform measurements
on this state. These purified protocols are equivalent
to the prepare and measure protocols described above.
However, less assumptions are needed about the devices
used. In the next section we will explain exactly which
assumptions about the devices in the prepare and mea-
sure protocol are necessary in order to apply our security
proofs. Afterwards we will prove the security of the pu-
rified protocols.
4We can purify Alice’s encoding operation in both pro-
tocols by finding an equivalence to a POVM acting on
the input of the encoding and half of a pure state such
that the other half of the pure state is the same as the
output from Alice’s encoding (see Fig. 3). In addition,
the outcome of the POVM is two random bits indepen-
dent of the input and therefore is the same as Alice’s
choice of encoding operation using a random string. We
use the following lemma to achieve this equivalence (see
the appendix for the proof). For the lemma, we define
the set of normalized positive semi-definite operators on
a Hilbert space H : S(H) := {τ ∈ P(H) : Tr(τ) = 1}),
where P(H) is the set of positive semi-definite operators
on H.
Lemma 1. Let {Ei}i=1..n be a set of n completely positive
trace-preserving maps from Hilbert space HA to Hilbert
space HD and σD ∈ S(HD) be a fixed density operator
on HD such that
1/n
n∑
i=1
Ei(ρA) = σD ∀ρA ∈ S(HA). (2)
Then there exists a fixed pure state |φ〉CD in HCD :=
HC ⊗HD, where dimHC = dimHD, and a complete set
of POVM elements {F iAC}i=1..n on HAC (so
∑
i F
i
AC =
1AC), such that ∀i,∀ρA ∈ S(HA) we have
nTrAC
(
F iACρA ⊗ |φ〉CD〈φ|
)
= Ei(ρA). (3)
FIG. 3: A depiction of Lemma 1. An encoding that takes a
quantum state and a random string as input, which is used to
choose which encoding to perform, always outputs a fixed
state (averaged over all encoding choices). This encoding
is equivalent to the scenario where a measurement, F , acts
jointly on the same quantum state input as the encoding and
half of a bipartite pure state |φ〉. The output of the measure-
ment is a random string, and the other half of |φ〉 is then the
same fixed state output from the encoding, averaged over all
measurement outcomes of F .
In the prepare and measure protocol there were four
encodings that Alice could do, and therefore n = 4 for
the application of this lemma. Now that the encoding is
purified, we purify all of the preparations of both proto-
cols.
In the perfect qubit version of both protocols, Alice
and Bob’s preparations are equivalent to starting with a
maximally entangled state |ψ+〉 = 1/√2(|00〉+ |11〉) fol-
lowed by a Z- or X-basis measurement (or probabilistic
distribution over the choice of the two measurements).
More generally, if we only assume that the preparations
are of qubits then they are equivalent to the maximally
entangled state |ψ+〉, followed by a measurement on one
of the two qubits. The non-measured qubit is then the
same as the prepared qubit [31]. It only makes Eve more
powerful to prepare both entangled states from Alice’s
encoding and from the purifications of the preparations,
so we can let her prepare these states.
Now the protocols can be described as follows. Eve
prepares a state ρABE and sends A to Alice and B to
Bob, and keeps part E. Alice and Bob perform one of
two measurements on each of their systems. Then Alice
and Bob do post-processing as in the prepare and mea-
sure protocol. Before we prove the purified protocol’s
security, we outline which assumptions we will make for
the security proof to hold.
ASSUMPTIONS
To specify exactly when our security proofs will apply,
we explicitly state the assumptions we will make about
the devices used in the protocols. Afterward we will dis-
cuss how these assumptions can be justified.
1. The states prepared are qubits. This assumption
can be avoided if instead an arbitrary bipartite
state is prepared and a measurement is performed
on one half of it, while sending the other half into
the appropriate channel. It can be assumed that
Eve holds a purification of this prepared bipartite
state.
2. The output state of Alice’s encoding operation is
independent of the input state, when averaged over
all encodings. Mathematically, this means that the
encoding satisfies Eq. 2 in Lemma 1.
3. Measurements detect each signal independently.
This means that the POVM elements have an i.i.d.
form.
4. Bob’s devices (when reverse reconciliation is per-
formed) or Alice’s devices (when direct reconcilia-
tion is performed) are characterized by a constant
overlap, γ, defined after Eq. 1.
5. There are no losses in the channels or detectors.
Assumption 1 is needed in order to purify the prepara-
tion process. Assumption 2 is needed in order for the en-
coding to have a purified form. Assumption 3 is needed
so that we can analyze the measurement outcomes in
5an i.i.d. way. Assumption 4 is needed to apply the un-
certainty relation Eq. 1. Assumption 5 is made for the
convenience of the security analysis, but can be removed
if Alice and Bob randomly assign a bit value for their
measurement in a time where a signal was sent but they
did not receive a measurement outcome.
Assumption 1 is valid if the preparations are done in a
purified way. Assumptions 2 and 3 are idealized assump-
tions necessary for our security proof method. However,
Assumption 3 is common for both device-independent
and device-dependent security proofs [26–28]. Assump-
tion 2 requires knowledge about Alice’s encoding device,
and could be justified to a good approximation. Such
assumptions are typical for device-dependent security
proofs [1]. However, Assumption 2 is not necessary if
the purified protocol is implemented directly.
The overlap γ that characterises the devices in As-
sumption 4 cannot be obtained without a description of
the POVMs for the measurements (if reverse reconcilia-
tion is performed), or a description of the encoding map
(if direct reconciliation is performed). However, Alice
and Bob can put a bound on a so-called ‘effective over-
lap’: γ∗. This effective overlap is defined differently than
the overlap in Eq. 1 (see Definition 7.2 in [32]), but it
satisfies the same uncertainty relation:
H(Z|B) +H(X|E) ≥ log 1/γ∗. (4)
The effective overlap has the advantage that it can be
upper bounded by measuring a CHSH value [33] if the
measurements have binary outcomes. We now define the
CHSH value and then we will describe the upper bound
on the effective overlap. Given a bipartite system, let M
and N be random variables representing the measure-
ment outcomes from choosing one of two measurements
randomly on one part of the system, and let R and S
be random variables representing the measurement out-
comes from choosing one of two measurements randomly
on the other half of the system. Then the CHSH value,
β, is defined as
β := 2(Pr(M = R) + Pr(N = R)+
Pr(M = S) + Pr(N 6= S))− 4.
Since the LM05 protocol measurements and encoding
choice are binary, the CHSH value provides an upper
bound for the effective overlap. It is not yet known if the
same relation between the effective overlap and a CHSH
value holds for more than two measurement outcomes
[34]. Therefore, it is not known how the effective overlap
may be upper bounded by the CHSH value for the SDC
protocol since there are four measurement outcomes and
four encoding choices in this protocol.
For the LM05 protocol, as long as preparations are
done in a purified way, Alice and Bob can run Version 2
of the LM05 QKD setup and find the CHSH value be-
tween Alice’s encoding choice and Bob’s measurement
outcomes. More precisely, Bob’s XOR of his Z- and X-
basis measurement outcomes with his preparation bit de-
fine the random variables R and S, while Alice’s bit val-
ues that correspond to the encoding sets S0 and S1 define
M and N . Despite Alice not performing a measurement
we can still define the CHSH value this way, since from
Assumption 2 we are guaranteed that Alice’s encoding
corresponds to a measurement via Lemma 1, where her
encoding choice corresponds to the measurement’s out-
comes.
The effective overlap is bounded by
γ∗ ≤ 1
2
+
β
8
√
8− β2. (5)
Note that no additional devices are needed to put a
bound on the effective overlap. Also, if desired, Alice or
Bob (depending on whether direct or reverse reconcilia-
tion is performed) can measure the CHSH value by them-
selves by using another measurement device on their side.
Alice can measure her CHSH value in the same way as
Alice and Bob did it jointly. Bob can measure his CHSH
value by running the purified QKD setup. In summary,
Assumption 4 can be justified by an experimental test on
the devices used in the LM05 protocol (see [32, 34] for
more details).
For the security proofs below we fix the overlap in As-
sumption 4 for each protocol. The overlap for the SDC
protocol, when reverse reconciliation is performed, be-
tween Bob’s two measurements is assumed to be 1/4
(which is true for the ideal Bell and Z ⊗ X-basis mea-
surements). For the LM05 protocol, where Bob’s prepa-
rations are done with a bipartite state and a measure-
ment, we assume that there are two measurements that
have an overlap of 1/2 with Bob’s measurements followed
by an XOR of the outcomes. The first is his measure-
ment on half of his prepared pure state in the other basis
and the second is his measurement in the other basis on
channel Q2. Note that this overlap occurs between the
ideal Z ⊗ Z-basis measurement followed by an XOR of
the outcomes and the X-basis measurement on his pre-
pared pure state and his X-basis measurement on the in-
put from channel Q2. In the case of direct reconciliation
this assumption changes to the overlap between Alice’s
POVM associated with her encoding (via Lemma 1) and
her measurement tensored with her purified preparation
measurement. While we have made these rigid assump-
tions for the security proofs, we can relax the assumption
that these overlap is exactly 1/2 for the LM05 protocol
and instead use the CHSH value bound on the effective
overlap [32, 34].
Assumption 5 is clearly not experimentally justifiable.
However, it can be removed if, whenever there is a miss-
ing measurement outcome at Alice or Bob’s detector, Al-
ice and Bob randomly assign a bit value. The error rates
will be increased, decreasing the key rate significantly.
We leave a more detailed analysis of loss as future work,
6which could follow along similar lines as [31].
It is important to note that no assumptions are nec-
essary about the Hilbert space that the signals of the
protocols are in (except, possibly, qubit preparations).
In addition, no assumptions need to be made about the
internal structure of the measurements on each signal, de-
scriptions of the preparations of bipartite states, or the
quantum memory used in the SDC protocol.
SECURITY PROOFS
The security proofs of the purified protocols can be
found via the Devetak-Winter rate [30], followed by the
application of the uncertainty relation of Eq. 1 [29]. The
security proofs can then be applied to the non-purified
SDC and LM05 protocols since they are equivalent to the
purified protocols. This equivalence is guaranteed under
Assumptions 1 and 2 of the previous section.
SDC Protocol
Now we define some states useful for the security proof.
The state that Alice, Bob, and Eve share after Alice and
Bob have done their measurements is
τZAZBE = FA ⊗ FB(ρABE), (6)
where ZA and ZB are the classical strings that result
from Alice and Bob’s measurements, FA and FB , which
are represented as completely positive trace preserving
(CPTP) maps. We assume that the measurements FA
and FB act independently on each signal, so that we can
apply the uncertainty relation to each measurement in-
dependently. Using Assumption 3 from the previous sec-
tion, the measurement’s POVM elements have the form
{⊗j F ijA }i and {⊗j F ijB }i, where i = i1i2i3 . . . . We
also define another state, ξ, where we only change Al-
ice’s measurement. This state has the important prop-
erty that H(ZB |E)τ = H(ZB |E)ξ. Intuitively this means
that Eve’s information about Bob’s string does not de-
pend on Alice’s measurement. The state ξ is defined as
ξXAZBE = GA ⊗ FB(ρABE), (7)
where XA is the classical string output from the mea-
surement GA on Alice’s side. We do not characterize
GA. However, we assume that the POVM elements of GA
are independent, and therefore have the form {⊗j GijA}i
(Assumption 3). We now define a third state that will be
used for the application of the uncertainty relation [29]:
σXAXBE = GA ⊗GB(ρABE), (8)
where GB have POVM elements of the form {
⊗
j G
ij
B}i
(Assumption 3) and its classical output is denoted as XB .
In addition, the only characterization we make for any of
the measurements is that the overlap between GB and
FB is maxij ‖F ikB GjkB ‖2∞ = 1/4 ∀ k (Assumption 4).
If Alice and Bob do one-way classical communication
for the post-processing after the protocol from Alice to
Bob and Bob’s measurement outcomes are used as the
raw key (which we call reverse reconciliation), then we
can write the Devetak-Winter rate [30] as
r ≥ H(ZB |E)τ −H(ZB |ZA)τ (9)
≥ H(ZB |E)ξ − h4(qF ) (10)
≥ 2−H(XB |XA)σ − h4(qF ) (11)
≥ 2− h4(qG)− h4(qF ), (12)
where hd is the d-ary Shannon entropy, qF is the error
rate probability distribution generated from ZA and ZB ,
and qG is the error rate probability distribution generated
from XA and XB . Specifically, these error rate probabil-
ity distributions consist of the probability that both bits
are the same, both bits are different, only the first bit is
different, and only the second bit is different.
In going from Eq. 9 to Eq. 10 we use the fact that
H(ZB |E)τ = H(ZB |E)ξ and we upper bound the en-
tropy H(ZB |ZA)τ by h4(qF ) by using the method of
types (Lemma II.2 of [35]). From Eq. 10 to Eq. 11 we use
the uncertainty relation Eq. 1 with the measurements FB
and GB . In Eq. 12 we use the method of types to bound
H(XB |XA)σ by h4(qG).
Alice and Bob estimate the error rates qG and qF by
revealing XA and XB as well as a small fraction of their
ZA and ZB strings in jointly specified positions chosen
uniformly at random. Alice and Bob have access to these
strings in the prepare and measure SDC protocol because
Bob actually performs FB and GB (these are the Bell
and Z ⊗ X-measurements in the perfect qubit scenario
respectively); Alice uses her encoding bits (which cor-
respond to her string ZA in the purified protocol via
Lemma 1); and her measurement and her resending of
the post-measurement state correspond to XA.
We have permutation invariance of the two-bit out-
comes and so we can apply the quantum de Finetti theo-
rem of Renner [36] to the protocol. Therefore the key rate
Eq. 12 is applicable for the most general type of attacks
by Eve. Due to the symmetry of the purified protocol we
could equivalently do direct reconciliation, where Alice
uses her classical string as the key and Bob corrects his
raw string. In this case the key rate is the same.
LM05 Protocol
The security proof of this protocol follows the same
method as the proof for the SDC protocol, however, there
are two differences that need to be taken into account.
The first is that Bob chooses a different basis for each of
his individual inputs from the channel Q2 according to a
7classical string, Θ. When a bit of Θ is 0, Bob will measure
in the Z-basis, and when a bit of Θ is 1, Bob will mea-
sure in the X-basis. The other difference is that there are
two different measurements that have the desired overlap
with Bob’s measurement FB in the uncertainty relation
Eq. 1 in the main text. In the perfect purified proto-
col, Bob’s measurement is a Z ⊗ Z-basis measurement
followed by an XOR of the two measurement outcomes.
Note that this measurement only has a one bit outcome,
and therefore the minimum overlap it can have with an-
other measurement is 1/2. The Z⊗Z measurement with
an XOR has two measurements with overlap 1/2, as can
be easily verified: measuring the first qubit in theX-basis
and discarding the second qubit or measuring the second
qubit in the X-basis and discarding the first qubit.
Now we define three states as we did in the SDC proto-
col’s security proof. We consider the case where reverse
reconciliation is performed and we discuss the case of di-
rect reconciliation at the end of this section. The state
that Alice and Bob share after they have done their mea-
surements, Bob has publicly announced his basis choices,
and Alice has done the sifting of her encoding bits is
τWAWBE =
∑
Θ
FΘA ⊗ FΘB (ρABE)⊗ |Θ〉〈Θ|. (13)
The classical outcomes of the measurements for Alice
and Bob are written as WA and WB respectively. We
assume (Assumption 3) that FΘA and F
Θ
B have POVM
elements that are independent on each signal so that
the uncertainty relation can be applied to each individ-
ual measurement. They have the form {⊗k FΘ,jkA }j and
{⊗k FΘ,jkB }j , where j = j1j2j3 . . . .
For the second state, we change Alice’s measurement
to be GΘ,iA , which has classical outcome V
i
A, and i ∈ {0, 1}
is a bit denoting two different measurements Alice could
choose. As with the SDC protocol, we do not specify the
measurements GΘ,iA . However, we do require that G
Θ,i
A
has POVM elements of the form {⊗kGΘ,i,jkA }j (Assump-
tion 3). This gives the state
ξiV iAWBE
=
∑
Θ
GΘ,iA ⊗ FΘB (ρABE)⊗ |Θ〉〈Θ|. (14)
Now we also define another state (which we’ll use for the
uncertainty relation), where we change the measurement
on Bob’s side to be GΘ,iB . That is
σiV iAV iBE
=
∑
Θ
GΘ,iA ⊗GΘ,iB (ρABE)⊗ |Θ〉〈Θ|. (15)
The measurement GΘ,iB has classical outcome V
i
B . The
measurement GΘ,iB acts independently on each signal,
and so its POVM elements have the form {⊗kGΘ,i,jkB }j
(Assumption 3). In addition, FΘB and G
Θ,i
B must satisfy
maxjk ‖FΘ,jlB GΘ,i,klB ‖2∞ = 1/2 ∀ i, l (Assumption 4).
We can now consider the Devetak-Winter rate [30]:
r ≥ H(WB |EΘ)τ −H(WB |WAΘ)τ (16)
≥ H(WB |EΘ)τ −H(WB |WA)τ (17)
≥ H(WB |EΘ)ξi − h(qF ) (18)
≥ 1−H(V iB |V iA)σi − h(qF ) (19)
≥ 1− h(qGi)− h(qF ). (20)
The error rates qGi are generated from V
i
A and V
i
B , and qF
is generated from WA and WB . Also, the binary entropy
is defined as h(q) := q log2 q + (1− q) log2(1− q).
From Eq. 16 to Eq. 17 we use the data processing
inequality on the second term to trace out Θ. From
Eq. 17 to Eq. 18 we use the fact that H(WB |EΘ)τ =
H(WB |EΘ)ξi , as well as the method of types to bound
the entropy H(WB |WA) by h(qF ) (Lemma II.2 of [35]).
In going from Eq. 18 to Eq. 19 we apply the uncertainty
relation Eq. 1 of the main text using the overlap of 1/2
between the measurements GΘ,iB and F
Θ
B . In the last line,
Eq. 20, we use the method of types to bound H(V iB |V iB)σi
by h(qGi). Since Eqs. 16 to 20 hold for i = 0 or i = 1
we can choose which lower bound on the rate r we would
like to use. We would like to have a high lower bound
and therefore we pick the minimum of the two binary
entropies:
r ≥ 1−min
i
h(qGi)− h(qF ). (21)
To estimate the error rates qGi and qF for Version 1 of the
LM05 protocol, Alice and Bob reveal V iA and V
i
B as well
as a small fraction of their WA and WB strings in jointly
specified positions chosen uniformly at random. In Ver-
sion 2, Alice and Bob reveal a small fraction of both their
V i strings and W strings in jointly specified uniformly
random positions. Alice and Bob have access to these
strings in the prepare and measure LM05 protocol be-
cause V 0A is the string of Alice’s measurement outcomes
and V 0B is the string of Bob’s preparation bits, while V
1
A
is the string of Alice’s preparation bits (i.e. from her
post-measurement state) and V 1B is the string of Bob’s
measurement outcomes before doing his XOR. WA and
WB come from Alice’s encoding bit (see Lemma 1), and
Bob’s XOR of his measurement outcomes and prepara-
tion bits. In both versions, the resulting key rate is the
same.
It is important to note that since there is a minimiza-
tion in Eq. 21 Alice can choose to either not do a mea-
surement or not do a preparation and then the key rate
loses the minimization, and instead she just uses the er-
ror rate that is estimated (qG1 for the former choice and
qG0 in the latter).
Also, we have permutation invariance of the outcomes
(due to the i.i.d. form of the measurements from As-
sumption 3) and so we can apply the quantum de Finetti
theorem of [36] to this protocol. Therefore the key rate
8Eq. 21 is applicable for the most general type of attacks
by Eve.
In addition, we could have chosen to do direct recon-
ciliation instead of reverse reconciliation. In this case,
the string Θ would represent Alice’s choice of encoding
from the set S0 or S1. The proof continues in the same
manner and the resulting key rate is the same.
COMPARISON WITH BB84
If we set the quantum channels to be fixed resources,
then we can use two BB84 protocol implementations
to compare with the SDC and LM05 protocols. The
first is two one-way BB84 protocols from Alice to Bob
(with an asymmetric basis choice so that basis sifting is
negligible in the infinite key limit). The second is the
Plug & Play version of BB84 using strong laser pulses
(see [2] and references therein). Note that Plug & Play
BB84 does not have the same level of security as one-
way BB84 [22, 23], LM05, or SDC as the measurement
devices need to be characterized. If we model the two
channels as depolarizing independent identical channels
[8, 9, 11] E : ρ 7→ q 1d +(1−q)ρ, where q is the probability
of depolarizing and d the dimension of the Hilbert space
on which ρ acts, then we see the key rates of Fig. 4 (Top).
The error rate plotted is q/2: the probability of having
an error when measuring a signal sent through one of the
channels, since with probability q the state is maximally
mixed. Since the channels are independent, the prob-
ability of being depolarized after passing through both
channels in succession is 2q − q2.
If instead only one channel is used for communication
from Alice to Bob and Bob to Alice, with the polarization
drift on the forward channel partially corrected by going
back through the channel [37], then the key rates follow
Fig. 4 (Bottom). That is, the probability of a state being
depolarized after passing through the channel is q and
the probability of a state being depolarized after passing
through the channel one way and then being sent back-
wards through the same channel is then only q (which is
less than 2q − q2, which would be the error rate if the
channels were independent). In Fig. 4 (Bottom) the er-
ror rate of the x-axis is also q/2 for easy comparison with
Fig. 4 (Top).
Note that the error rates used to calculate the key rate
of the SDC protocol depend upon the probability of get-
ting errors in the first bit only, the second bit only, and
both bits of the two-bit measurement outcomes. This
means that these error rates for the G-measurement ba-
sis (the Z ⊗X-basis in the perfect implementation) are
q/2(1− q/2), (1− q/2)q/2, and q2/4 respectively for the
situations in Fig. 4. For the F -measurement basis (the
Bell-basis measurement in the perfect implementation)
the error rates are all (2q − q2)/4 for the situation in
Fig. 4 (Top) and q/4 for the situation in Fig. 4 (Bot-
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FIG. 4: (Color Online) Top: Log base 10 of the key rates
vs. the error rate (i.e. half the probability of having a state de-
polarized) for uncorrelated independent identical depolarizing
channels. Bottom: Log base 10 of the key rates vs. the error
rate (i.e. half the probability of having a state depolarized) in
one channel, where the channels are correlated such that the
probability of becoming depolarized through one channel is
the same as the probability of being depolarized when going
forwards and backwards through the same channel. The plot-
ted key rates are: two copies of the one-way BB84 protocol
performed from Alice to Bob and from Bob to Alice (blue,
solid), the SDC protocol (green, dashed), the LM05 protocol
(cyan, dot dashed), the Plug & Play protocol (red, dotted).
tom).
Importantly, the SDC protocol key rate exceeds both
BB84 key rates in the scenario of Fig. 4 (Bottom), and it
can also tolerate a higher error rate of 11.8%. This is be-
cause the correlation between the forward and backward
channel makes the error rate in the F -measurement basis
lower. This advantage increases if the error rate of pass-
ing forwards and then backwards through the channel is
smaller.
9CONCLUSION
We have shown a general method to prove security
of two-way QKD protocols. We have applied this proof
method to two such protocols, namely one based on super
dense coding (SDC), and another based on a previously
proposed two-way protocol (LM05) [7]. These two proto-
cols are secure against the most general types of attacks
by an eavesdropper and provide the following key rates:
SDC: rSDC ≥ 2− h4(qG)− h4(qF )
LM05: rLM05 ≥ 1−mini h(qGi)− h(qF ), (22)
where in the later i = 0, 1 denotes two possible measure-
ments Alice could choose. Importantly, few assumptions
are needed about the devices used. This is a step to-
wards device independence for two-way QKD protocols.
We make the following assumptions to apply our security
proof: preparations are done in a purified way (i.e. an
arbitrary bipartite state is prepared and half of it is mea-
sured, while the other half is used as the preparation),
Alice’s encoding output is a fixed state, measurements
are done independently on each signal, and a fixed over-
lap constant characterizes either Bob or Alice’s devices
(depending on whether reverse or direct reconciliation
is performed). The first assumption can instead be the
assumption that qubits are prepared. Interesting future
work could be to remove some of these assumptions while
still providing the same rates of security.
We have shown that these protocols have comparable
performance to different implementations of the BB84
protocol, and can even exceed the BB84 rate in certain
relevant parameter regimes. In addition, the key rate we
obtain for the LM05 protocol is higher than that of [20].
The determinism of two-way protocols in the infinite-
key case is not an advantage since an asymmetrical basis
choice in the BB84 protocol makes it deterministic as
well. However, in the finite-key regime, the BB84 pro-
tocol is not deterministic [31]. Therefore both the SDC
and LM05 protocols will have an advantage over BB84
implementations when finite keys are used.
In addition, an advantage that the LM05 protocol has,
which is not apparent in the infinite key limit, is that
there is a higher fraction of key bits per signal sent com-
pared to the BB84 and SDC protocols. If the basis bias
for BB84 and the SDC protocol used for parameter esti-
mation is p, then 2p(1− p) fraction of the signals are lost
due to basis sifting. However, in the LM05 protocol, if c
is the probability that Alice does her measurement, and
p is the probability that Alice and Bob use the Z-basis,
then only 2p(1− p)c fraction of the signals are lost. This
advantage would have a positive effect on the finite-key
rate.
Our work paves the way for fully exploiting the po-
tential of entropic uncertainty relations in two-way QKD
with finite-key sizes for any possible implementation. We
did not evaluate the finite-key regime here, but the tech-
niques of [31, 38] could be used to show security for two-
way protocols. We leave this as future work.
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APPENDIX
Here we provide the proof of Lemma 1 that purifies
Alice’s encoding operation. It establishes an equivalence
between a POVM acting on half of a pure state and a
CPTP map of a particular form.
Lemma 1 (POVM equivalent to a CPTP map).
Let {Ei}i=1..n be a set of n completely positive trace-
preserving maps from Hilbert space HA to Hilbert space
HD and σD be a fixed density operator on HD such that
1/n
∑n
i=1 Ei(ρA) = σD ∀ρA ∈ S(HA).
Then there exists a fixed pure state |φ〉CD in HCD :=
HC ⊗HD, where dimHC = dimHD, and a complete set
of POVM elements {F iAC}i=1..n on HAC (so
∑
i F
i
AC =
1AC), such that ∀i,∀ρA ∈ S(HA) we have
nTrAC
(
F iACρA ⊗ |φ〉CD〈φ|
)
= Ei(ρA). (23)
Proof. Summing over i in Eq. 23 implies that we require
TrC(|φ〉CD〈φ|)=σD, and therefore we fix |φ〉CD to be a
purification of σD. Now we can constructively determine
what the POVM elements F iAC are in terms of σD and
the maps Ei. Then we will show that this construction
of the POVM satisfies all necessary requirements above.
Let σD =
∑
j λj |j〉D〈j|, so then |ψ〉CD =∑
j
√
λj |jj〉CD. Expanding ρA in an orthonormal ba-
sis {|ψm〉}m gives ρA =
∑
ml rml|ψm〉A〈ψl|, which allows
us to write Eq. 23 as∑
jkml
nTrAC
(
F iACrml|ψm〉A〈ψl| ⊗
√
λjλk|jj〉CD〈kk|
)
=
∑
jkml
nrml
√
λjλk
(
AC〈ψlk|F iAC |ψmj〉AC |j〉D〈k|
)
=
∑
ml
rmlEi(|ψm〉A〈ψl|). (24)
This must be true for all ρA and therefore we have ∀ m, l∑
jk
n
√
λjλk〈ψlk|F iAC |ψmj〉|j〉D〈k| = Ei(|ψm〉〈ψl|),
n
√
λjλk〈ψlk|F iAC |ψmj〉 = 〈j|Ei(|ψm〉〈ψl|)|k〉 ∀m, l, j, k.
(25)
Eq. 25 gives a constructive way of finding the POVM
elements F iAC . If σD has full rank then F
i
AC is com-
pletely determined by this equation. If σD is not of full
rank then F iAC can be decomposed into a part on the
support of σC := TrD(|φ〉CD〈φ|) and its kernel: F iAC =
F iACsuppσC
⊕F iACkernσC . The block on the suppσC is com-
pletely specified by Eq. 25, and the block on kernσC can
be chosen arbitrarily as long as F iACkernσC
≥ 0, for all i
and satisfy
∑
i F
i
ACkernσC
= 1ACkernσC . It is clear from
Eq. 25 that
∑
i F
i
ACsuppσC
= 1ACsuppσC .
Now we need to verify that the POVM elements satisfy
F iAC ≥ 0 for all i. We write the maps in their Choi-
Jamio lkowski representation [39, 40]:
Ei(|ψm〉A〈ψl|) = TrA(J iAD(|ψm〉A〈ψl|)T ⊗ 1D) (26)
= 〈ψm|J iAD|ψl〉, (27)
where J iAD are the Choi-Jamio lkowski matrices for the
maps Ei. Now we can write F iACsuppσC from Eq. 25 as
F iACsuppσC
=
1
n
1√
σC
(J iAC)
T 1√
σC
, (28)
where J iAC :=
∑
jk |j〉CD〈j|J iAD|k〉DC〈k|. From this
form it is clear that this block is positive, and so F iAC ≥ 0
for all i.
